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Threats from Botnets
Ji Yimu and Liu Shangdong
Abstract
At present, various cyberattacks based on Botnet are the most serious security 
threats to the Internet. As Botnet continue to evolve and behavioral research on 
Botnet is inadequate, the question of how to apply some behavioral problems to 
Botnet research and combine the psychology of the operator to analyze the future 
trend of Botnet is still a continuous and challenging issue. Botnet is a common 
computing platform that can be controlled remotely by attackers by invading sev-
eral noncooperative user terminals in the network space. It is an attacking platform 
consisting of multiple Bots controlled by a hacker. The classification of Botnet and 
the working mechanism of Botnet are introduced in this chapter. The threats and 
the threat evaluation of Botnet are summarized.
Keywords: Botnet, threat evaluation, Botnet classification, Botnet threat
1. Introduction
In 1990, the continuous development of the global economy led to the continu-
ous reform and innovation of information technology, which gave birth to the 
computer and the Internet, and Internet technology was introduced into every 
household. In the new century, with the globalization and informatization of 
network, computer network has become indispensable knowledge for the develop-
ment of the Internet. At present, the demand of computer network is increasing, 
and various social organizations such as enterprises, governments, and schools are 
constantly connecting themselves to the network to exchange and share informa-
tion resources. With the interconnection of global networks, the Internet is every-
where in the world. From China’s core report the 43rd Statistical Report on Internet 
Development in China [1], we can see the development of the Internet in China and 
the country’s emphasis on the Internet.
The number of Internet users in China has increased gradually from 2007 to 
2019, reaching more than 829 million in 2018. The penetration rate of the Internet 
also increased dramatically year by year. In 2018, the penetration rate was more 
than 59.6% for the population. It can be seen that the resources of the Internet are 
accessible to everyone.
The emergence of the Internet has brought a lot of convenience to people’s 
life, but meanwhile, with the continuous expansion of network scale, the security 
risks have been exposed. For the computer network itself, there are some inherent 
security risks in design. With the network scale gradually expanding and com-
plex network environment, many criminals make use of the vulnerability on the 
network for network invasion, information leakage, hacker blackmail, and other 
attacks. These hazards not only affect people’s safe use of the network but also can 
lead to the disclosure and destruction of sensitive information of enterprises, public 
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institutions, military, and financial institutions, adversely affecting the national 
economy and security. According to the data of the 2018 China Internet Cyber 
Security Report provided by the China National Internet Emergency Center [1], the 
number of security vulnerabilities collected by the National Information Security 
Vulnerability Sharing Platform is 14,201 in 2018.
Botnet is a common computing platform which can be controlled remotely by 
attackers by invading several noncooperative user terminals in network space. 
“Invading in network space” refers to an area where hackers can enter and exit at 
will to send arbitrary information and files within an IP block or an Internet region; 
“noncooperative” means that a vulnerable computer receives no warning notice for 
the upcoming attack; and “remote control” means that a Botnet usually has a C&C 
server that can remotely accept control commands from hacker and concurrently 
send the corresponding instructions in the form of messages to the corresponding 
infected host (Bot). Over time, a small Bot can be expanded to be a Botnet with 
thousands of Bots, which, due to the large number of Bots, has high-performance 
storage size and fast computational response time. Making use of these character-
istics, hackers can easily occupy network flow and launch corresponding persistent 
attacks on a specific target, such as mail attacks, HTTP flooding attacks, etc. At this 
stage, Botnet has become the main attacking method used by hackers. Due to its 
simple formation and various types, Botnet has become one of the biggest threats to 
Internet security and a key research topic by experts.
A Botnet is an attacking platform composed of multiple Bots that is controlled 
by the commands that hackers send to it, and its behavior is also controlled by 
hackers. Therefore, the attack of Botnet is generally controlled by the subjective 
consciousness of the hacker, which leads to the threat generated by it making it hard 
to locate and predict its threat. From the last century to the present, Botnet attacks 
not only cause network equipment paralysis but also seriously affect the country at 
political and economic level, involving military aspects as well. Many newspapers 
and magazines have published Botnet attacks. In the early twenty-first century, the 
Conficker Botnet, which was spread by network sharing and U disk, has spread tens 
of thousands of host computers, and this Botnet mainly made use of the vulner-
ability MS08–067. During that attack, not only the personal computer was affected, 
but also the national defense platforms of Germany and the United Kingdom 
were affected to varying degrees. Some aircrafts were delayed because the attacks 
prevented releasing of normal commands. In 2016, the United States experienced 
a large area of network outage, which was caused by a denial-of-service attack on 
Dyn, a famous American company. The company emphasized that the attack covers 
millions of IoT devices around the world (the source IPs of UDP/domain name 
server (DNS) attack are almost fake IPs, so this number does not represent the 
number of Bots) and some of the important attacks are from IOT devices. Through 
analysis, the culprit of the incident was the Mirai Botnet, whose source code was 
published online [2]. According to the 2017 China Internet Security Report, more 
than 200,000 IP addresses in the Chinese mainland have been affected by hacker 
attacks, including more than 4000 C&C servers serving to convey commands. 
These cases show that Botnet poses a serious security threat to China.
China, even the whole world, has paid great attention to the security problems 
caused by Botnet. In the field of scientific research, on January 23, 2008, the 
“Seminar of Response to Botnet” sponsored by China National Internet Emergency 
Center/Coordination Center (CNCERT/CC) was held in Huaxin Building, Beijing. 
At the International Supply Media Conference held in Nice, France, in 2017, Derek 
Manky, head of global security strategy of Fortinet, said that the intelligent cluster 
networks could replace Botnet as a new threat in the future. At the 8th International 
Conference on Communication and Network Security (ICCNS) in 2018, research 
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topics such as communication and network security, malware and Botnet, and com-
munication privacy and anonymity were discussed in depth.
There are several reasons why Botnet can become the biggest security threat in 
the world:
1. The development history of Botnet is divided into two phases. It mainly is 
a kind of virus or worm in the first phase and transforms into the Botnet 
platform in the second phase. The advantages of the virus are rapid infection 
and rapid transmission, but the disadvantages are also obvious, that is, the Bot 
cannot be controlled by the hacker, the degree of infection cannot be perceived 
by the hacker, and the infected geographical area is very limited and cannot be 
expanded on a large scale. In summary, the virus is small scale but uncontrol-
lable. The Botnet combines the advantages of the virus and overcomes the 
shortcomings of virus, so it is very popular among hackers.
2. The virus attack has the characteristic of integration. Botnet is different, the 
control command of Botnet is issued by separate C&C server, and the attack 
and invasion are completed by the controlled Bot. The C&C server and the 
controlled host will make requests and connections through HTTP packets. 
In this way, hackers only need to send a few commands to the C&C server to 
launch diversified forms of attack, which improves the flexibility of Botnet and 
enhances the concealment of Botnet.
3. Security is the foundation of each computer field, and the development of any 
field will be accompanied by technical achievements in the security of this 
field. Because Botnet and security measures are developed in a certain order, 
Botnet can rise rapidly during this period. In the expansion process of Botnet, 
the first thing is to find the C&C server, and the hackers will make use of the 
vulnerability to snatch the control of the host. For example, Mirai Botnet will 
use the weak password vulnerability to hack into the server’s telnet port to gain 
control of the host; the IRC Botnet will break the shared chat room server for 
the construction of its own C&C server; due to lack of security awareness of 
users, some companies’ cloud servers are also hacked by hackers and used as 
C&C server, such as Alibaba Cloud, Tencent Cloud, etc.
4. The Botnet applies the knowledge of the key to the management of the Botnet 
controller in order to prevent the entire Botnet from being uncontrollable 
after the C&C server is compromised by security experts, so as to improve 
its concealment and survivability. For example, in a decentralized Botnet, 
multiple C&C servers are used for unified control, and encryption technology 
and authentication technology are used in the process of message transmission 
between C&C servers; in this way, illegal messages cannot be accepted by the 
controller so as to prevent replay attacks.
Through the above analysis, the process of defending Botnet can be sum-
marized into five steps: analysis and detection, trusted tracking, measurement, 
situation prediction, and counterattack. Among them, the “analysis and detection” 
is to find cues of Botnet from the data flow; the “trusted tracking” is to determine 
the information source of the Botnet; the “measurement” is to manipulate the 
architecture, life cycle, and attack process of the Botnet; the “situation prediction” 
is to evaluate the next activity of the Botnet in advance and to prevent and warn in 
advance; and the “counterattack” is to reduce its activity and break the C&C server 
to paralyze the Botnet.
Computer Security Threats
4
At present, there are many different methods for detecting Botnet. For example, 
Moheeb and others built a real network flow monitoring system to analyze the flow 
records, binary file types, Botnet control commands, etc.; Cai [3] evaluated the key 
behavioral characteristics of HTTP Botnet and designed a detection method for 
HTTP Botnet based on feature analysis; Song [4] adopted displacement entropy 
and Kalman filtering to detect and analyze the characteristics of P2P Botnet and 
proposed the corresponding detection algorithm; XU found that P2P Botnet shows 
higher robustness when random nodes fail, but the robustness declines rapidly 
when central nodes fail; and Chen proposed a solution to the problem that HMM 
method cannot be adopted for flow detection of hierarchical Botnet.
2. Classification of Botnet
Botnet has many types of classification, and it can be divided into centralized 
Botnet and distributed Botnet according to different operating principles.
1. For centralized Botnet, there is only one C&C server in the whole Botnet 
platform, and all Bots are connected to the C&C server. C&C server has the 
right to control all Bots.
2. For distributed Botnet, the Bots will also have message communication between 
each other. According to different command and control protocols, the central-
ized Botnet can be classified into three categories: IRC-based Botnet, HTTP 
Botnet, and custom protocol Botnet [5–7]. According to topological structure, 
the distributed Botnet can be classified into three categories: structured P2P 
Botnet, unstructured P2P Botnet, and hierarchical Botnet [8, 9]. Table 1 lists 
the classification of some known Botnets. Although there are multiple con-
trol servers in some Botnets, such as Mega D and Mariposa [10], Bots do not 
communicate with each other, and they are still classified into the category of 
centralized Botnet.
2.1 Centralized Botnet
IRC-based Botnet: In the early days of the Internet, the earliest centralized 
Botnets were mainly IRC-based Botnets, which mainly used IRC services to com-
municate between C&C servers and Bots (Figure 1(a)). This type of Botnet has 
a simple structure and adopts the known plaintext protocol [11]. Through the 
monitoring of activity cycle of the Botnet (such as ports and messages), the charac-
teristics can be clearly identified, and these data flow can be easily filtered out in the 
Type Protocol Examples
Centralized IRC-based Botnet SdBot, AgoBot, GT-Bot, RBot
HTTP-based Botnet Rustock, ClickBot, Naz, Zeus, Conficker, Torpig
Custom protocol Botnet Mega D, Mariposa
Distributed Structured P2P Botnet PhatBot
Unstructured P2P Botnet Sinit, Nugache
Hierarchical Botnet Waledac, Storm
Table 1. 
Classifications of some known Botnets.
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network defense. This type of Botnet has a little impact because of its small scale. 
However, due to its simple operating mechanism and strong operability, it is deeply 
used by hackers. With the current development of Botnet, many hackers still use it.
HTTP-based Botnet: Due to the easy identification of messages of IRC-based 
Botnet, the HTTP-based Botnet arose. This type of Botnet could hide itself well by 
adopting HTTP protocol. Since the communication protocols between devices on 
the Internet are mainly HTTP protocol, HTTP messages in the information trans-
mission of HTTP Botnet can be mixed with normal messages, making it difficult to 
filter directly through the router rules (ACL), which greatly improves the survival 
ability of Botnet and makes it more concealable. It is known that the HTTP-based 
Botnet is more complex and diverse than IRC-based Botnet. Rustock, Zeus, Torpig, 
etc. encrypt the content of the communication, and Conficker and Torpig also 
adopt a technique named “domain-flux” to increase the difficulty of blocking 
their control servers [12]. In addition, a small number of Botnets, such as Naz, also 
directly use popular social networking sites (such as Facebook, QQ space, etc.) 
as control servers, increasing the difficulty of detection and blocking [13]. Most 
Botnets currently use the HTTP protocol.
Custom protocol Botnet: Some Botnets use custom protocols for communica-
tion. The known Botnets of this type include Mega D, Mariposa, etc. Since Mega D 
Figure 1. 
Three types of Botnet structure.
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uses a custom protocol, the first thing for researchers is to understand its operat-
ing mechanism through means of data mining and analysis or reverse capability. 
Compared with the IRC protocol and the HTTP protocol, Mariposa uses the UDP 
protocol for transmission, which does not require a three-way handshake. It is more 
difficult to be shielded by router rules (ACL), and its survivability is stronger.
2.2 Distributed Botnet
For the Botnets described above, the overall structure is a C&C server connected 
to multiple infected Bots. When the C&C server is broken by security experts, the 
Botnet is not available anymore. In order to enhance the survivability of Botnets, 
hackers increase the number of C&C servers and allow Bots to communicate with 
each other, so the distributed Botnet arise. This type of Botnet has a complicated 
structure, is difficult to construct, and requires a hacker with strong capabilities. At 
present, there are many distributed Botnets (such as Waledac and Storm), whose 
viability has been verified.
Structured P2P Botnet: The communication protocol between such Botnets 
is not unstructured (P2P protocol). A typical example of structured Botnet is 
PhatBot, which uses a fully connected Waste Protocol, which leads to a poor scal-
ability of the PhatBot [14]. Early Storm adopted Overnet based on the Kademlia 
protocol [15] as a way of command and control. Since the information of other 
nodes can be obtained by the lookup operation in the Kademlia protocol, the 
researchers could make use of this feature to display the set points in all Overnet 
networks and then fill in many virtual set points (which we set), so that many mes-
sages and file transfers in Botnet will be introduced to the masquerading set points. 
In this way, the Bots are identified, and the judgment on the scale of Storm Botnet 
and the defense against it are finally achieved.
Unstructured P2P Botnet: The Bots under this model are connected irregularly, 
and they can communicate with each other. The communication method is also 
irregular, and they can send messages in a one-to-many way. There are many types of 
unstructured P2P Botnets, with two main ones (Nugache and Sinit). The operating 
mechanism of Sinit is random scanning, which adopts a scan code in the source code 
to filter some necessary IP segments, aimlessly identify other Bots. The message is 
sent through port 53, with a poor degree of concealment. The Nugache Botnet keeps 
a list internally. When the Botnet asks for a connection, it selects an uncertain record 
from the list of connection. If it is not successful, the random selection will continue; 
if it is successful, the connecting parties will refresh the list with each other [16]. 
Dittrich made an effort to keep sending message requests, refresh the list, and enu-
merate the whole Nugache network by recording and finally draws the structure dia-
gram as shown in Figure 1(b). It is found from the structure diagram that Nugache 
applies a range interval to the exit and entry massage of the Bot, giving birth to a P2P 
network with random connectivity. This decentralized topology, combined with the 
encryption of communications, allows Nugache to have very good concealment and 
keep a substantial number of active Bots unnoticed for a long time.
Hierarchical Botnet: This type of Botnet is referred to as hybrid P2P Botnet 
in some literature [17], and it is believed that the most prominent feature is the 
hierarchical structure. The structure is divided into at least three layers, the Bottom 
layer is the Bots, the middle layer consists of some Bots or C&C servers with better 
performance as the medium for information transmission, and the top layer is the 
core C&C server. This structure can prevent the top layer from being discovered by 
researchers and achieve more complex functions. Kanich et al.’s further research on 
Storm found that the Storm is a three-layer Botnet [18]. The Bots in the bottom layer 
could send HTTP messages, virus information, etc. The Bots can use the Internet to 
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query other proxies infected host, and the most top hacker server (C&C server) is 
behind the proxy infected host, with a high degree of concealment.
Waledac is another large-scale hierarchical Botnet, which is also used to send 
large amounts of spam. Waledac has a similar hierarchical structure as shown in the 
above (Figure 1(c)). It has a structure of one more layer than the ordinary hierar-
chical structure, and relevant research shows that it is transformed on the basis of 
the previous hierarchical Botnet. Botmaster is mainly divided into four layers of 
institutions (from bottom to top for Spammer, Repeater, TSL, UTS). The lower two 
layers are computer devices with vulnerabilities. The upper two layers are the hier-
archical C&C servers used by hackers. The communication method of this Botnet is 
a technology named fast-flux. The third layer (Repeater) serves as a bridge between 
the second layer and the fourth layer of Bots, that is, using Bot as a proxy. This is 
different from the Koobface [19] Botnet, which uses trusted social networking sites, 
game sites, and other large server devices as its own proxy layer. Waledac is more 
viable in this way. Nunnery et al.’s research found that Waledac is able to offer two 
different levels of spam business. Through experiments, the researchers found that 
due to the diversity of the Bots in the bottom layer of Waledac, it has the function of 
sending spam, but this ability is not strong, and it is easy to be directly intercepted 
by some large-scale defense servers; there is also a spam service that can be sent 
directly by the second layer (TSL) of the Waledac Botnet. This method of sending 
can dynamically modify the contents of the file to prevent it from being killed by 
the fixed antivirus software, with high availability. At the same time, in order to 
further improve the concealment of Botnet and prevent it from being detected by 
network supervisors, Waledac’s internal message transmission mechanism is based 
on elliptic curve encryption to implement encryption technology. A two-in-one 
technique (timestamp + public key) is used on the communication between the sec-
ond and third layers to prevent replay and forgery [20]. In order to prevent security 
personnel from tracking Botnet, Waledac adopts the detection method of domain 
name polling to prevent the population of fake nodes [21].
Koobface also adopts an intermediate node as a proxy to hide the control server. 
But Koobface is notable not for its complex structure but for its numerous func-
tional modules and the way it uses social networking sites to spread its messages. 
Koobface steals the accounts of social networking sites on Bots, automatically logs 
in and sends malicious links to friends for transmission, which exploits the trust 
between social network users. Koobface has a range of modules targeted at almost 
all major social networks and can force infected users to recognize Captcha images, 
as well as DNS hijacking, search, hijacking, web server and information theft, etc.
3. Working mechanism of Botnet
As shown in Figure 2, the life cycle of a Botnet is divided into six phases: (1) 
There are many ways for a Botnet to propagate a Bot program, such as page virus, 
vulnerability attack, email phishing, etc.; (2) If the host is infected, then the Bot 
program will remain in the system; (3) hosts with vulnerabilities send domain name 
query to domain name server to obtain IP address of Botnet controller; (4) host with 
vulnerabilities will connect the Botnet controller and join Botnet; (5) communica-
tion connection between Bot and Botnet controller start, as well as the issuance and 
transmission of commands between attacker and Botnet controller; and (6) the Bot 
attacks the victim at the command given to the controller.
In phase 1, Botnet adopts email phishing or URL hidden connections to link 
to some web pages and runs malicious code on the page; this propagation mode is 
similar to worm propagation mode. Both of them are to attack vulnerable services 
Computer Security Threats
8
by scanning specific ports with specific algorithms, which is very common. There 
are various algorithms to determine how and when to scan. The Bot does not 
implement any propagation at first until it receives the command from the attacker, 
which makes detection more difficult for Botnet [22].
In phase 2, when the computer with vulnerabilities is attacked, it will turn into 
Bot, and the C&C server will give a command of program installation (such as the 
echo command in Mirai). This process can be a one-step or multistep installation. 
For example, a control program is downloaded first, and then the entire Botnet 
program will be downloaded at a later stage. In addition, some Botnets that exist 
with chat software will also spread by Relay Node, which is not easy to be found, but 
also have problems such as delay.
In phase 3, the IP address of the early Botnet controller is directly written in the 
Bot program, which has the disadvantage of low concealment, so at this stage, the 
Bot program contacts the C2 controller through the DNS domain name.
In phase 4, because the victim host joined Botnet in different ways, in order to 
improve the security of the Botnet, it adopts a certain authentication mechanism. 
Only authenticated hosts can join the Botnet group and carry out communication and 
control interactions. In addition, the Botnet controller is also selected by the hacker 
in the Botnet group. In order to prevent these controllers from being shut down or 
offline, the attacker will generally adopt DNS technology to replace the domain name 
with a new IP address when the controller goes offline or it is captured. Furthermore, 
fast-flux technology is used to provide an IP list, and the IP address is periodically 
bound from the list to the domain name to improve reliability and detection difficulty. 
The Botnet also replaces the legitimate domain name server on the infected host with 
its own DNS name server, which has three benefits: (1) if the Bot program is cleared 
by the host user, some Bots will even reinfect the host through their own DNS name 
Figure 2. 
Working process of Botnet.
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server; (2) make some antivirus programs unable to update itself; and (3) implement 
phishing attacks to enable users to access fake websites [23].
In phase 5, the main activity is C&C communication, receiving information 
sent by the hacker. Botnet maintains communication with the Bot and at the same 
time protects itself from being captured by the security system. Bot will accept 
or actively acquire commands, infect more machines, or download updates to the 
Botnet code. At this stage, due to the original fixed IP, fixed domain name, dynamic 
update, etc. are less concealed, and Botnet will often adopt domain-flux or fast-flux 
technology to improve its survivability.
Domain-flux technology is created to solve the problem of central point failure. 
The attacker uses the domain-flux protocol to prevent itself from shutting down 
by the defense personnel. The C&C domain name accessed by the Bot is no longer 
statically hard coded but can be dynamically generated, which allows the C&C 
server to communicate securely with the Bot [24]. The principle of the domain name 
algorithm is DGA algorithm, which puts a comprehensive factor such as a dictionary, 
a random number, a date, and a hot topic into a generation algorithm, generates a 
string of special character prefixes, and adds a TLD to obtain a final domain name 
resource. Because of its fast generation speed and high frequency, even with the use 
of blocking, shielding, and other measures, it cannot protect against invasion. Torpig 
and Conficker, which appear on the web in general, adopt this technical feature. At 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the foundation of fast-flux appeared and 
gradually attracted more and more attention. Fast-flux is created to address the prob-
lem of security personnel locating C&C server domains and IP (both bound to each 
other) through reverse technology. In general, when a domain name server is used to 
query the IP of a certain domain name, the result of the query will return the same 
IP in a short period of time because of the DNS cache. However, fast-flux technology 
can constantly change the correspondence between IP addresses and domain names, 
and it makes a large number of queries in a short period of time to return to different 
results. The fast-flux is divided into two categories (single-flux and double-flux) 
according to the different number of mapping layers. Single-flux is the fast-flux that 
has only one mapping layer, a domain name that has one and only one continuously 
changing IP address. Double-flux represents the fast-flux with two mapping layers. 
In the actual Internet environment, hackers deploy multiple domain name servers. 
By modifying the domain name of the top-level server, the correspondence between 
the IP address of the lower-layer DNS server and the domain name is constantly 
changing. A Botnet employs fast-flux technology, which would have a large number 
of C&C servers, and most of the servers are not controlled by the hackers themselves 
but by Bots. During the check, the security personnel will find that there is no control 
command from a hacker on the “C&C servers”; these controllers are only responsible 
for the command forwarding and springboard function, which virtually improves 
the concealment of the Botnet. Fast-flux technology can also be used to break the 
domain names of certain phishing websites and malicious websites. Storm adopts this 
technology to analyze the domain name that sends the message. Phish rock criminal 
organization adopts it to resolve the domain name of phishing website [25]. Waledac 
also adopts fast-flux technology to conceal its control server.
In phase 6, the Botnet receives the command sent by the hacker and launches 
the attack. The attack modes (as shown in Table 2) are different [26]; the number 
of Bots participating in the attack, attack target, and the attack means can also 
be completely controlled by the hacker. Botnet initially launches a single- or 
multi-machine distributed denial-of-service attack. Gradually, Botnet turns into 
profitable attacks, such as stealing users’ privacy information on victim machines. 
For many years, Symantec’s global annual cybersecurity report stated that the 
vast majority of spam is sent by Botnet. Spam sent by Botnet is more harmful than 
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regular spam, making detection more difficult. The process of phishing attack is 
initiated by Botnet: the Bot erases and replaces the addresses of legitimate DNS on 
the machine. When the user accesses the confidential page, the replaced domain 
name server sends the phishing website page to the user [27].
4. Botnet threats and assessment
The threat assessment of traditional Botnet mainly starts from its several key 
performances; the stronger the key performance of Botnet, the stronger the threat. 
The key performance indicators of traditional Botnet mainly include four points: 
transparency, concealment, destruction resistance, and attack capacity.
The transparency of Botnet is mainly reflected in that when an attacker main-
tains a Botnet or orders a Botnet to attack a certain site, the Botnet can be operated 
as a whole and there is no need to pay any attention on the internal details of 
the Botnet. This transparency is mainly realized through the control structure. 
Attackers input operation commands and control information into the control 
structure, and the control structure continuously transmits relevant contents to 
various nodes, so as to control the Botnet as a whole.
The concealment of Botnet means that the activities in the main stages of the 
life cycle of traditional Botnet need to be carried out covertly, to effectively reduce 
the possibility of detection of the nodes, operating facilities and overall data flow 
of Botnet, etc. The concealment of Botnet requires that network nodes should not 
occupy memory and broadband resources too significantly and the damage to the 
availability of controlled hosts should be relatively small. The most important thing 
is to prevent itself from checking by the end user to avoid being discovered by the 
network security supervision system.
The destruction resistance of Botnet mainly refers to the key characteristic that 
Botnet is able to maintain its attack ability when some nodes are cleared or destroyed, 
which is also called tenacity. The great performance of destruction resistance makes 
the Botnet have strong survivability and can create more superior conditions for the 
attacker to adjust the behavior characteristics of the Botnet node, thereby effectively 
avoiding the occurrence of the entire Botnet failure. The main way is to build a more 
robust structure of Botnet to improve its destruction resistance.
The attack capacity of Botnet mainly refers to the sum of all controllable 
resources that can be controlled by an attacker. The attack capacity determines 
the maximum attack strength that an attacker can initiate, and the attack capacity 
mainly depends on broadband resources and network size. The attack flow that an 
attacker can initiate increases with the increase of broadband resources. The larger 
the network size, the more URLs can be exploited by an attacker, and the more 
dispersed attack source, the fewer constraints in the attack process.
Attack mode Difficulty for detection Complexity Damage
Small-scale DDoS attack High Low Low
Large-scale DDoS attack Medium Medium High
Stealing information Low High Medium
Sending spam Medium Medium High
Phishing Medium High Medium
Table 2. 
Common modes and characteristics of attack initiated by Botnet.
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These key performance indicators can be roughly divided into three categories: 
transparency and concealment belong to the Botnet’s defense capability, destruction 
resistance belongs to the Botnet’s survivability, and the attack capacity belongs to the 
Botnet’s attack capability. In addition to the above key performance indicators, there 
are some more detailed indicators, but they fall within these three capabilities, such 
as command accessibility of Botnet, node averaging of Botnet, Botnet resilience, etc.
With the rise of the Internet of Things, the rapid development of smart 
terminals, and the continuous improvement of mobile network technologies, in 
addition to traditional Botnet, mobile Botnet has become one of the main plat-
forms threatening mobile network security. After the mobile Botnet invades the 
intelligent terminals in the mobile Internet, these smart terminals are controlled 
in a one-to-many way through controlling and command channels. It can be seen 
that mobile Botnet is a subset of traditional Botnet, but it is far more harmful to 
users than traditional Botnet. Due to the particularity of the mobile network, its 
threat assessment has its own unique indicators in addition to the key performance 
indicators of traditional Botnet. The threat assessment for mobile Botnet can be 
started with the following performance indicators: attack performance, defensive 
performance, survivability, auxiliary performance, and environmental perfor-
mance. There are more specific indicators in each performance indicator, such as 
confidentiality and node control efficiency in attack performance, stability and 
anti-detection capability in defense capability, network averaging and network 
connectivity in survivability, propagation capabilities and command mechanism 
performance in auxiliary performance, scalability and loan consumption in 
environmental performance, and more.
5. Conclusions
At present, various cyberattacks based on Botnet are the most serious security 
threats to the Internet. As Botnet continue to evolve and behavioral research on 
Botnet is inadequate, the question of how to apply some behavioral problems to 
Botnet research and combine the psychology of the operator to analyze the future 
trend of Botnet is still a continuous and challenging issue.
Botnet is a common computing platform which can be controlled remotely by 
attackers by invading several noncooperative user terminals in the network space. 
It is an attacking platform consisting of multiple Bots controlled by a hacker. The 
behavior of Botnet is also controlled by the hacker, rather than being controlled 
by certain code logic, which also makes it difficult to locate and predict the Botnet 
attack. The Botnet is developed in two phases: it was the primary virus and worm 
in the first phase, and it transformed into Botnet platform in the second phase. The 
virus attack has the characteristic of integration. Botnet is different, the control 
command of Botnet is issued by separate C&C server, and the attack and invasion 
are completed by the controlled hosts.
Botnet has many types of classification, and it can be divided into centralized 
Botnet and distributed Botnet according to different operating principles. The dif-
ference is that there is only one C&C server in the entire network platform for the 
centralized Botnet, and the infected nodes also communicate with each other in the 
distributed Botnet.
The attack process of the Botnet is mainly divided into six phases: in the first 
phase, Botnet will spread through various traditional viruses or worms; in the second 
phase, the Bot begins to download the entire Botnet program; in the third phase, the 
Bot contacts Botnet controller; in the fourth phase, the Bot is authenticated, and the 
authenticated Bot can join the Botnet group; in the fifth phase, C&C communication 
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between Botnet and Bot will start to receive information sent by the hacker; and in the 
sixth phase, the Botnet launches an attack based on commands sent by the hacker.
The Botnet is popular all over the world, which poses a huge threat to the global 
Internet and the Internet of Things. DDoS attack is still one of the largest Internet 
security threats in the world, and the DDoS attacks are mainly launched by Botnet.
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